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CASENOTES
The Constitutionality of Regional Banking Laws: Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System' — The banking industry is undergoing major
transformation as states pass statutes lifting the traditional barriers to interstate banking.
Since 1982, many states have enacted legislation allowing out-of-state bank holding
companies to acquire their banks. 2 The federal Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
(BHCA) regulates the acquisition of banks by bank holding companies.' The BHCA
requires a bank or bank holding company to obtain approval from the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) before acquiring a bank
or substantially all of the assets of a bank.4 The Douglas Amendment, section 3(d) of
the BHCA, prohibits the Federal Reserve Board from approving any acquisition of a
bank located in one state by a bank or bank holding company in another state unless
"the acquisition is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the state in which
such bank [the one to be acquired] is located, by language to that effect and not merely
by implication,"'
1
 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of state statutes permitting
interstate banking. See infra note 3 for a definition of "bank holding company." See infra note 3
for a definition of "bank."
5 Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982). The BHCA defines a "bank" as
an "institution ... which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on
demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans." Id. § 1841(c). A "hank
holding company" is defined by the BHCA as a company that controls any bank or bank holding
company. Id. § 1841(a)(1).
Id. § 1842(a). The BlICA provides:
It shall be unlawful, except with prior approval of the Board, (1) for any action to be
taken that causes any company to become a bank holding company; (2) for any action
to be taken that causes a bank to become a subsidiary of a hank holding company; (3)
for any hank holding company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of
... any bank; (4) for any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof other than a
hank, to acquire all or substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank
holding company to merge or consolidate with any other hank holding company.
Id.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 established the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. H 221-
530 (1982). Since 1914, national banks have been required and state banks have been permitted to
become members of the Federal Reserve System. Id. H 282, 321. See infra note 55 and accompanying
text. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System (member banks) are subject to certain
requirements, such as the maintenance of reserves against a percentage of demand and time
deposits, and qualify for certain benefits, such as the Federal Reserve System's check clearing
system. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1137, 1151 (1981).
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is composed of seven members,
appointed by the President for terms of fourteen years. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). The Board has the
authority to supervise member banks, control the money supply, and regulate bank holding com-
panies. Ginsburg, supra, at 1151, 1157. See also Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1982); Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50.
5 12 U.S.C. § I842(d). The Douglas Amendment was added to the BHCA on the Senate floor.
See generally 102 CONG. Rec. 6750-58, 6854-62 (1956). Senator Douglas of Illinois proposed the
amendment. See id. The Douglas Amendment states:
irilo application ... shall be approved under this section which will permit any bank
holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting
shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any additional bank
821
822	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:821
At the time Congress passed the MICA, no state had enacted the requisite
authorizing statute.6
 Therefore, the Douglas Amendment's initial effect was to ban all
interstate bank acquisitions. In 1982, however, Massachusetts passed a statute lifting
this ban on interstate bank acquisitions on a regional basis.? The Massachusetts
statute allows out-of-state bank holding companies based in New England to
establish or acquire Massachusetts banks provided the acquiring company's home
state gives equal acquisition privileges to Massachusetts bank holding companies. 8
Connecticut adopted a similar regional banking statute in 1983. 9
 The effect of
located outside the State in which the operations of such bank holding company's
banking subsidiaries were principally conducted on July 1, 1966, or the date on which
such company became a bank holding company, whichever is later, unless the acqui-
sition ... is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank
is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).
6
 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545,
2548 (1985). Beginning in 1972, states passed statutes permitting interstate bank acquisitions in
limited circumstances. See infra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
7 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2548; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West 1984). The
Massachusetts statute provides in part:
IA]n out-of-state bank holding company 	 may establish or acquire direct or indirect
ownership or control of more than five per cent of the voting stock of one or more
banking institutions or bank holding companies; provided that the laws of the state in
which operations of the subsidiary banks of such out-of-state bank holding company
are principally conducted expressly authorized, under conditions no more restrictive
than those imposed by the laws of the commonwealth as determined by the commis-
sioner, the establishment or the acquisition of direct or indirect ownership or control
of more than five per cent of the voting stock of banks, or companies controlling one
or more banks in that state, by bank holding companies whose banking institutions
principally conduct their operations in the commonwealth .... For the purposes of
this section, the term "out-of-state bank holding company" ... shall include only those
companies which have their principal places of business in one of the states of Con-
necticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island or Vermont and which are not directly
or indirectly controlled, within the meaning set forth in said Bank Holding Company
Act, by another corporation which has its principal place of business in a state other
than the commonwealth or one of the states referred to above.
Id.
6 Id. The Massachusetts statute has what is referred to as a reciprocal privileges clause. See id.
New England bank holding companies include those located in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See id.
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-552 to 36-557 (1985). The Connecticut statute provides in part:
Any New England bank holding company may, with the approval of the commissioner,
establish or acquire and retain direct or indirect ownership or control of all or part of
the voting stock of any Connecticut bank, Connecticut savings bank, Connecticut
savings and loan association or Connecticut bank holding company, if the laws of the
state in which the operations of the subsidiary banks of such New England bank
holding company are principally conducted, within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. Section
1842(d), expressly authorize, under conditions no more restrictive than those imposed
by the laws of Connecticut as determined by the commissioner, the establishment or
acquisition and retention of direct or indirect ownership or control of all or part of
the voting stock of banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations or bank holding
companies having their principal places of business in such state by Connecticut bank
holding companies.
Id. § 36-553 (1985). The Connecticut statute further restricts the definition of "New England bank
holding companies" to exclude bank holding companies directly or indirectly controlled by bank
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these statutes and others like them has been the formation of interstate banking
regions.w
These banking confederations typically exclude the large money-center banks" and
some of these banks have challenged the constitutionality of state regional banking laws. 12
Because these new statutes discriminate against out-of-region holding companies and
arguably conflict with the Douglas Amendment, they raise substantial equal protection
and supremacy clause issues. The supremacy clause's of the Constitution requires con-
sistency between state regional banking statutes and federal banking legislation)* Op-
ponents of regional banking laws argue that the Douglas Amendment did not contem-
plate state banking legislation that is regional in nature, and therefore, the state statutes
are invalid under the supremacy clause or the commerce clause. 15 Furthermore, the
equal protection clauselO of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution prohibits
states from drawing statutory classifications that are not rationally related to furthering
a legitimate state purpose." Because regional banking statutes classify out-of-region bank
holding companies outside of New England. Id. 36-552(j)(3) (1985). This provision eliminates the
possibility of a non-New England bank holding company "leapfrogging" into the Connecticut market
through a New England state that may enact an interstate banking statute without regional restric-
tions. Appendix to the Order Approving the Application of Bank of New England Corporation, Boston, -
Massachusetts, to Merge with CBT Corporation, Hartford, Connecticut, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 379, 379 n.1
(1984) [hereinafter Appendix]. See infra note 30.
10 See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of regional
banking zones.
" The money-center banks are those located in New York, Illinois, California and Texas. Note,
The Supreme Court — Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv. 120, 283 n.3 (1985). See also Northeast Bancorp,
105 S. Ct. at 2549.
12 Citicorp has been one of the most active challengers to the regional banking laws. See Northeast
Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2549. See also Amicus Curiae Briefs of Bank of New York and Chase Manhattan
Bank, Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
12 The supremacy clause of the Constitution provides: "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14 Under the supremacy clause, enforcement of any state law requires that it not be in conflict
with federal law. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913) (where there is a direct conflict,
federal regulation supersedes stale regulation); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (dictum)
(state legislation must give way to federal legislation where a valid "act of Congress fairly interpreted
is in actual conflict with the law of the State"). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 6-24 (1978). See also infra note 177 and accompanying text.
Golembe & Kumin, Regional Interstate Banking Compacts: Ill-Conceived and Unconstitutional
Anomalies, 18 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 993 (1985); Note, supra note 11 at 283; Note, Regional Banking Laws:
An Analysis of Constitutionality Under the Commerce Clause, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 548 (1984) [here-
inafter Note, Regional Banking Laws]; Note, The Constitutionality of State Statutes Governing Interstate
Acquisitions by Bank Holding Companies: Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 59 ST. Jotinrs L. REV. 380 (1985) [hereinafter Note, State Statutes].
10 The equal protection clause provides that no state may "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S, CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17 Legislation that does not classify on the basis of a suspect classification or infringe on a
fundamental right is subject to the rational basis standard of review. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
97 (1979). This standard requires that state legislation be "rationally related to furthering a legiti-
mate state interest." Id. An illegitimate purpose is sufficient to invalidate a state statute. Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63, 65 (1982). In Zobel, the Court used the rational basis test to determine
the constitutionality of an Alaska statute which provided for payments of dividends to citizens
according to the length of their residence in the state. Id. at 58-60. The Court held the statute
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holding companies according to their home state and exclude nonregional holding
companies to promote the economic well-being of local, regional banks, equal protection
problems are inherent. 18 In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Supreme Court examined the effects of the supremacy and the equal
protection clauses on regional banking laws.'"
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemn arose out of
three applications to the Federal Reserve Board for approval of interstate bank acqui-
sitions." Bank of New England Corporation, a Massachusetts bank holding company,
applied for approval of its merger with CBT Corporation, a Connecticut bank holding
company.22 Next, Hartford National Corporation applied for approval of its acquisition
of Arltru Bank Corporation, a Massachusetts bank holding company." Lastly, Bank of
Boston Corporation of Massachusetts sought approval of its proposed acquisition of
Colonial Bancorp, Inc., a Connecticut bank holding company. 24
The Federal Reserve Board invited public comments on the three proposed inter-
state mergers." Three banking institutions — Northeast Bancorp, Inc., Union Trust
Company, and Citicorp — challenged the proposed interstate mergers, 26 claiming that
unconstitutional under the rational basis test on the grounds that its purpose of rewarding long-
term residents for past contributions was "not a legitimate state purpose." Id. at 63.
l" See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985). In Metropolitan Life, the
Court held that promoting domestic business and encouraging capital investment in state assets
were not legitimate purposes under the equal protection clause. Id. at 1684.
13 105 S. Ct. 2545, 2548 (1985). The Supreme Court in Northeast Bancorp did not mention the
supremacy clause, but it addressed a supremacy clause issue in analyzing whether the state statutes
are consistent with the Douglas Amendment, which is a federal statute. Id. at 2550-53.
20 105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
21 Id. at 2549. The Bank Holding Company' Act requires application for Federal Reserve Board
approval. 12 U.S.C. § I842(a). See supra note 4.
22 Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 374 (1984). See Northeast Bancorp v.
Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 1984).
23
 Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353, 353 (1984). See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at
204. Arltru Bank Corporation owns the Arlington Trust Company, a bank located in Lawrence,
Massachusetts. Hartford Nat?, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 353.
n Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524, 524 (1984). See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at
204.
25 Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 205-06. The Board must send notice of applications it receives
to the Federal Register for publication. 12 C.F.R. § 225.14(b)(2) (1985). The Federal Register notice
invites comment on the application for a period of no more than 30 days. Id. See Application Notice,
49 Fed. Reg. 6012 (1984) (notice of Bank of Boston application); Application Notice, 48 Fed. Reg.
53,172 (1983) (notice of Hartford National Corp. application); Application Notice, 48 Fed. Reg.
41,524 (1983) (notice of Bank of New England application).
25 See Appendix, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 379; Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2549. Under the Bank
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1850,
a party who would become a competitor of the applicant or subsidiary thereof by
virtue of the ... acquisition ... shall have the right to be a party in interest in the
proceeding and, in the event of an adverse order of the Board, shall have the right
as an aggrieved party to obtain judicial review thereof ....
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. and Union Trust Company both challenged Bank of New England's
proposed acquisition of CBT Corp. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2549. Northeast Bancorp, Inc.
owns Union Trust Company, a Connecticut bank that competes directly with banks owned by CBT
Corp., Hartford National Corp., and Colonial. Id. The Federal Reserve Board held that Northeast
Bancorp, Inc., a Connecticut bank holding company, would clearly become a competitor to the




the Massachusetts and Connecticut regional banking legislation was discriminatory and
unconstitutional under the commerce,27 equal protection, 28 and compact clauses29 of the
United States Constitution. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve Board approved all three
of the proposed interstate bank acquisitions." The Board determined that the acquisi-
tions came within the Douglas Amendment because the Massachusetts and Connecticut
interstate banking statutes specifically authorized them. 31 The Board found that Congress
intended to give the states discretion to lift partially the Douglas Amendment's prohib-
ition on interstate bank acquisitions." According to the Board, "while the issue was not
free from doubt," there was no "clear and unequivocal" basis for finding the regional
banking laws unconstitutional."
The three banking institution challengers petitioned the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the Board's orders approving the Bank of
(a Connecticut bank). Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 376 n.6. See 12 U.S.C. § 1850
(1982). In addition, Bank of New York agreed to acquire Northeast Bancorp if Connecticut or the
United States enacts the necessary enabling legislation. See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2549. See
also Bank of New York Co., Inc., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 527 (1984) (Board denied Bank of New York's
application for approval of its proposed acquisition of Northeast Bancorp of Connecticut).
Northeast Bancorp previously had tried to challenge the Connecticut regional banking statute,
but the Connecticut federal district court dismissed the action on the grounds that Northeast
Bancorp lacked standing. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Woolf, 576 F. Supp. 1225, 1234 (D. Conn.
1983) (court held that plaintiffs failed to allege concrete injury traceable to the challenged statute
and redressable by a favorable decision of the court), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1984).
Citicorp, a New York bank holding company, challenged all three proposed acquisitions.
Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2549. As a corporation offering financial services to consumers and
businesses nationally through its bank and nonbank subsidiaries, Citicorp perceived the statutes of
Connecticut and Massachusetts as an obstruction to its own acquisition objectives in New England.
See id. The Federal Reserve Board held that Citicorp was a party in interest because Citicorp
competes on a limited basis in Connecticut and Massachusetts and, except for the restrictions in
Massachusetts's and Connecticut's regional banking laws, it has the potential to become a more
substantial competitor. Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 376 n.6.
" See infra note 36 for the text of the commerce clause. Those challenging the state regional
banking legislation contended that the statutes burdened commerce outside the region and that
the Douglas Amendment did not authorize specifically such a burden. See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S.
Ct. at 2553-54.
28 See supra note 16 for the text of the equal protection clause. The banks, such as Citicorp,
claimed that the state statutes violated the equal protection clause by excluding bank holding
companies from some states and admitting those from other states. See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct.
at 2555.
29 See infra note 47 for the text of the compact clause. The challengers of the Massachusetts
and Connecticut statutes claimed that the statutes constituted a compact to exclude non-New
England banks in violation of the compact clause, which prohibits certain agreements between
states. See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2554.
"Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 525-20; Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Buil, at 376-
77; Hartford Nat'l, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 354. For the Board's constitutional analysis with respect to
all three of these applications, see Appendix, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 379-86.
51 Bank of Boston, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 525; Bank of New England, 70 Fed. Res. Bull, at 375;
Hartford Nat'l, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 354.
52 Appendix, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 386. The Board said that "the Douglas Amendment should
be read as a renunciation of federal interest in regulating the interstate acquisition of banks by
bank holding companies." Id. at 380.
." Bank of New England, 70 Fed, Res. Bull. at 377. The Board maintained that it would not hold
a state law unconstitutional unless it found clear and unequivocal evidence of unconstitutionality.
Id.
826	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:821
New England-CBT and Hartford National Corporation-Arltru acquisitions." The Sec-
ond Circuit consolidated the three petitions for review and stayed the acquisitions pend-
ing review: 35
The Second Circuit found no violation of the commerce clause," holding that the
Douglas Amendment authorized Massachusetts and Connecticut to enact statutes per-
mitting interstate bank acquisitions on a regional basis. 57 The court reasoned that without
these state laws, no interstate bank acquisitions could occur, so the statutes actually
promoted interstate commerce rather than restricting it." In considering the application
Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 206. Under section 9 of the Bank Holding Company Act, any
party aggrieved by an order of the Board may petition for a review of the order in the United
States Court of Appeals, and the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm, set aside, or modify the
Board's order. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1982).
" Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 206. Initially, the court of appeals consolidated the petitions
for review of the orders of the Board approving the Bank of New England-CBT and Hartford
National Corporation-Arltru acquisitions. Id. The court then permitted Bank of New England,
CBT, Hartford National Corporation, the State of Connecticut, and the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts to intervene. Id. At the same time, the court granted Bank of Boston Corporation's
motion to consolidate the petition for review filed in its action with the petitions already before the
court. Id.
36
 740 F.2d at 208. The commerce clause grants Congress the power "filo regulate Commerce
... among the several states . ..." U:S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cI. 3. The commerce clause has a dual
purpose. It is both an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce and
a limitation on state power to burden such commerce. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35-
36 (1980); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrel, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976).
When a party challenges a state statute, claiming that it interferes with Congress's authority to
regulate interstate commerce or burdens such commerce, and Congress has not authorized the
state to regulate such commerce, the Court weighs the state interests furthered by the statute against
the burden on interstate commerce. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). In Pike v.
Bruce Church, the Court summarized its commerce clause balancing test:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id.
When the state legislation evinces economic protectionism, the Court has applied strict scrutiny.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (facial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny). The Court has held that state legislation that is discriminatory on its face and effects
simple economic protectionism gives rise to a presumption of invalidity. Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36 (citing
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
A clear and affirmative authorization from Congress will exempt the states from commerce
clause limitations. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1984). Where
Congress has not acted, commerce clause restrictions described above remain intact. Where Con-
gress has been silent, the commerce clause is often referred to as the dormant or negative commerce
clause. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 418-21, 433 (1946).
" Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208. The court of appeals noted that congressional authori-
zation which removes state laws from commerce clause scrutiny "must be clear." Id. (citing South-
Centro( Timber, 467 U.S. at 91; White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204,
213 (1983); Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 653-54).
,8 Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208. In addition to finding no violation of the commerce clause,
the appellate court found no violation of the compact clause. Id. at 208-09. See infra note 47..
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of the equal protection clause to the Massachusetts and Connecticut regional banking
statutes, the appellate court maintained that the state legislation must be rationally related
to the achievement of legitimate state purposes. 39 These regional banking laws, the court
found, fostered the banking industry in New England and protected Massachusetts and
Connecticut hanks from competition with larger banks in New York and Chicago. 4° The
court concluded that because banking is of "profound local concern," 4 ' the state statutes
furthered legitimate purposes and did not violate the equal protection clause."
The challengers petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. They
again claimed that the Douglas Amendment did not authorize the regional bank acqui-
sitions and that the state statutes permitting interstate bank acquisitions only on a regional
basis were unconstitutional." The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 44
In Northeast Bancorp, the United States Supreme Court held that the Connecticut
and Massachusetts statutes are consistent with federal law embodied in the Douglas
Amendment45 and do not violate the commerce,46 compact," or equal protection 45 clauses
of the United States Constitution. 49 The Court found that, in adopting the Douglas
Amendment, Congress intended to allow states to lift partially the ban on interstate
banking. 5° The Court therefore concluded that the state regional banking statutes are
consistent with federal law.s' Because Congress authorized these state statutes through
the Douglas Amendment, the Court explained, the statutes are invulnerable to consti-
Although the court found evidence of an agreement between Massachusetts and Connecticut, it
noted that an agreement only violates the compact clause if it interferes with the supremacy of the
United States. Id. at 209. The appellate court concluded that regional banking statutes would not
violate the compact clause because they would not increase the political power of New England or
infringe upon federal supremacy. Id. at 209.
'9 Id. Under the equal protection clause, economic legislation must bear a rational relationship
to a Legitimate state purpose to survive equal protection scrutiny. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
10 Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2cl at 209. The court of appeals acknowledged that each of the four
largest New York bank holding companies has greater assets than those of all the New England
bank holding companies combined. Id. at 206 n.16.
11 Id. at 209 (quoting Lewis, 447 U.S. at 38).
49 Id. at 209-10.
" Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. CI. at 2548.
" Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
45
 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553. For text of Douglas Amendment, see supra note 5. In
reviewing the issue of consistency between the federal and state statutes, the Northeast Bancorp Court
was deciding a supremacy clause question, although the Court did not specifically identify it as
such.
16 See supra note 36.
47 The compact clause provides, Inio State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State ...." U.S. CUNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. An
agreement between states violates the compact clause if it is "directed to the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978) (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)). In
Northeast Bancorp, the Court held that even if a compact exists, it does not violate the compact clause
because it does not infringe upon federal supremacy. 105 S. Gt. at 2555. This casenote does not
include an analysis of the compact clause issues in the Northeast Bancorp case.
" See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
19 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2556.
so a at 2553.
51 Id.
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tutional attack under the commerce clause." Finally, the Court held that the regional
banking laws are rationally related to legitimate state purposes and therefore do not
violate the equal protection clause."
In Northeast Bancorp, the Supreme Court failed to recognize that protectionism
effected by discriminatory legislation is never a legitimate state purpose. The Court
therefore inappropriately upheld discriminatory state statutes granting acquisition priv-
ileges to a specified region's banks while excluding all out-of-region banks. The equal
protection clause should protect out-of-state entities from state parochialism. While
Congress could devise a regional banking system free of the dangers of state parochi-
alism, a state statute permitting interstate banking only within a preferred region and
excluding disfavored states raises significant equal protection issues. Because the Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut statutes were designed to foster the growth of their local
banks and to insulate them from competition from large money-center banks, these
statutes are invalid under the equal protection clause. Because Congress historically has
deferred to states with respect to the geographic expansion of banking, it is likely that
Congress intended to exempt the states from commerce clause limitations when it enacted
the Douglas Amendment. Congressional authorization, however, does not remove state
regional banking laws from equal protection scrutiny. For this type of banking legislation
to be valid under the Constitution, Congress, not the states, must enact a regional banking
system.
This casenote begins by tracing the background of the statutory regulation of
interstate banking. Section Il discusses recent court decisions that are relevant to the
constitutionality of regional banking laws. Section III presents the Supreme Court's
opinion in Northeast Bancorp. Section IV then analyzes the Massachusetts and Connecticut
regional banking laws in light of federal statutory law and the equal protection Clause.
This section concludes that although these regional banking laws are consistent with
federal law, they are unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. The history of
banking together with the language and legislative history of the Douglas Amendment
indicate that Congress intended to permit the states to enact regional banking laws.
These state statutes, however, violate the equal protection clause. By upholding regional
banking laws as enacted by individual states, the Court's decision will lead to haphazard
and inconsistent development of regional banking zones. Congress could create a re-
gional banking system, but the states do not have that power. Until Congress creates
such a regional system, the Court should find state laws authorizing interstate bank
acquisitions by banks from a select group of states in violation of the equal protection
clause.
I. STATUTORY BANKING REGULATION
A dual system of federal and state legislation regulates the banking industry in the
United States. 54 Banks may be chartered by federal law (a national bank) or by state law
52 Id.
"Id. at 2556. Petitioners abandoned the equal protection claim in the petition for certiorari,
but after the Metropolitan Life decision, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985), discussed infra notes 118-22,
petitioners filed a supplemental brief urging the Court to consider the equal protection issue.
Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555. The Court agreed to do so because the Federal Reserve Board
and the court of appeals had reviewed the issue. Id.




(a state bank). 55 At the heart of federal banking regulation is the Bank Holding Company
Act (BHCA) of 1956, which brings corporations owning banks under federal regula-
tion.56
When Congress first proposed the BHCA in 1955, the McFadden Act already
prohibited banks from engaging in interstate branch banking." The McFadden Act,
however, did not regulate holding companies and thus, banks used holding companies
as a device to provide interstate branch banking. 55 Congress designed the BHCA to close
this loophole and bring bank holding companies under federal regulation." The two
primary purposes of the BHCA were to prevent undue concentration in commercial
bankingeo and to separate banking from nonbanking activities. 6 '
Ginsburg, supra note 4; Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN.
I.. REV. 1 (1977).
65 Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1139. A hank must have a charter expressly authorizing it to
engage in the business of banking. Id. The chartering entity primarily regulates the bank, but banks
may freely convert from state charter to national charter and vice versa. Scott, supra note 54, at 8-
9. Originally, states served as the sole chartering authority for banks. See W.A. LovErr, supra note
54, at 10; Scott, supra note 54, at 5 n.22. Congress created a national bank system in 1863. W.A.
Lovers, supra note 54, at 11; Scott, supra note 54, at 5 11.22.
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982). See supra note 3 for the definition of a bank holding company.
See also Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1157-60.
" 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982). A bank "branches" when it establishes an office "physically separated
from its main office, with common services and functions, and corporately part of the bank."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (5th ed. 1979). State laws varied widely in the extent to which they
permitted branching. Some states did not permit any branching ("unit bank" states), while others
allowed limited branching, such as within the home or contiguous county. See Ginsburg, supra note
4, at 1153. The McFadden Act allows national banks to branch to the extent the statute law of the
bank's home state authorizes state banks to branch, but only "at any point within the state in which
it is shunted." 12 U.S.C. § 36(c). See also Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis v. Hughes, 385 111. 431,
436, 53 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1944) (The McFadden Act "expressly prohibits the opening of any branch
or additional office in any state other than that of its domicile."). Thus, the state-by-state banking
system originated in state law but became embedded in federal law through the McFadden Act and
the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1156.
" 102 CoNc. REc. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas); Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1156
(citing G. FISCFIER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 25 (1961)). Banks also used holding companies to
circumvent state laws restricting intrastate branching. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1156. See also W.A.
Lovn-T, supra note 54, at 153.
6" H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 11 (1955). See CONG. REc. 6858-61 (1956).
The BHCA of 1956, through the Douglas Amendment, prohibited almost entirely interstate
"branching" in contravention of state law. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
6" S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2483.
61 Id, Section 3(a) of the BHCA requires Federal Reserve Board approval for transactions such
as formation of a bank holding company and merger of bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(a) (1982). See .supra note 4 for the statutory language of section 3(a). In determining whether
to grant approval for a proposed transaction, the Board considers anticompetitive effects, financial
and managerial resources, and community needs. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982). Section 4 of the Act
curtails the acquisition of certain nonbanking enterprises by banks. Id. § 1843. Section 7 reserves
to the states a continuing rote in the regulation of bank holding companies. Id. § 1846. Section 7 is
sometimes referred to as the savings provision. It provides:
The enactment by the Congress of this chapter shall not be construed as preventing
any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may
hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies and subsidiaries thereof.
Id.
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As the Senate considered the BHCA, Senator Douglas proposed, and the Senate
passed, an amendment prohibiting a bank holding company from owning a bank in a
state other than that of its principal bank unless the other state by statute allows the
ownership. 62 Although the original House bill contained an absolute prohibition on
interstate bank acquisitions, Congress enacted the Douglas Amendment with consent
from the House. 63 Legislative history suggests that Congress viewed the immediate effect
of the Douglas Amendment as a flat ban on interstate banking because no state permitted
any interstate bank acquisitions." In fact, no state passed the requisite enabling legislation
until 1972. 65
Although state legislation allowing interstate bank acquisitions is a recent phenom-
enon, banks have employed a variety of other means to offer services on an interstate
basis. 66 Technological developments in automation, data processing, electronic flows of
information, and electronic funds transfer enable banks to communicate and to service
customers over long interstate distances. 67 Banks use nonbank subsidiaries not subject
to state and federal banking legislation to provide limited bank services in interstate
markets." Thus, with the advent of state statutes lifting some of the barriers to full
interstate banking, banking institutions were already offering limited financial services
on a multistate basis. 69
62 Id. § 1842(d). See supra note 5 for the text of the Douglas Amendment.
68 H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See Davis, A Legal Analysis of Reciprocal Interstate
Banking, in COMMERCIAL BANKING AND INTERSTATE EXPANSION 147, 148 (1985).
" See 102 CONG. REC. 6861 (1956). Senator Bricker stated: "Pin effect, [the Douglas Amend-
ment] constitutes an absolute prohibition against future expansion by bank holding companies." Id.
" See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
66 See generally W.A. LoyErr, supra note 54, at 151; Frieder, Legislating for Interstate Bank Expan-
sion: Financial Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J. CORP. L. 673, 697-706 (1984); Ginsburg, The Future
of Interstate Banking, 91 CORP. L. 655. 659 (1984).
Frieder describes various methods that banking organizations use to provide financial services
on an interstate basis. Frieder, supra, at 697-706. Those bank holding companies that expanded
interstate before Congress enacted the Douglas Amendment were permitted to continue their
existing operations under "grandfather provisions." Id. at 697.
67 Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 655-56. There is some debate as to whether banks experience
economies of scale when they expand. See id. at 659. Mr. Ginsburg suggests that declining data
communication costs and the economies of scale associated with information handling will result. in
substantial savings for expanding multibillion dollar banks. Id. He acknowledges, however, that
most empirical studies have found that banks do not experience economies of scale above a relatively
small size. Id.
68
 The Bank Holding Company Act defines a bank as an entity that both offers demand deposits
and makes commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). See supra note 3 for text of statute.
Therefore, an institution that does not provide both of these services does not qualify as a "bank"
and is free to open offices on an interstate basis. These institutions that offer a more limited range
of financial services than commercial banks and are not defined as banks are called "nonbank banks"
or "nonbanks." Nonbank activity is permissible if it is deemed to be "so closely related to banking
or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto ...." BHCA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1982). Bank holding companies may engage in various nonbank activities, including
mortgage banking, credit-card servicing, operating trust companies, and investment advising. For
a current list of approved activities, see 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1985). Banks use loan production offices
(LPO's) to solicit loans on a nationwide basis. See Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 684 n.49.
69
 In addition to operating nonbank institutions on a nationwide basis, the bank holding com-
panies that had expanded prior to the 1956 BHCA were permitted to maintain the banks they had
already acquired. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 1159. The Douglas Amendment "grandfathered" the
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The state statutes lifting the Douglas Amendment's prohibition on interstate banking
have varied widely. Iowa, the first state to enact interstate banking legislation, in 1972
permitted an out-of-state bank holding company already owning Iowa banks to acquire
additional banks within the state.'° Alaska, 7 ' Maine, 72 and Arizona's have adopted full-
scale interstate banking and permit unlimited entry by out-of-state bank holding com-
panies. New York allows out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire their banks only
if the acquiring bank holding company's home state accords reciprocal acquisition priv-
ileges to New York bank holding companies.' 4 Other states have allowed out-of-state
bank holding companies to establish special-purpose banks 75 or to acquire "failing
banks." 76
In 1982, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a regional interstate banking
law, allowing out-of-state bank holding companies only from the other New England
states to acquire Massachusetts banks." The statute specifically admits only those out-of-
state bank holding companies with principal places of business in one of the New England
states of Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont. 78 The Mas-
sachusetts statute also contains a "reciprocal privileges" provision limiting the purchase
of a Massachusetts bank to those bank holding companies based in states which accord
equivalent bank acquisition privileges to Massachusetts bank holding companies: 78 Con-
necticut passed a statute almost identical to Massachusetts' in 1983. 80
nineteen multistate bank holding companies in existence in 1956. Id, at 1159 n.122 (citing GOLEMBE
ASSOCIATES, INC., A STUDY OF INTERSTATE BANKING BY BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 33 (1979)).
7° IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1985). See infra note 87. The BHCA grandfathered
the out-of-state bank holding company already owning Iowa banks. See infra notes 85-102 and
accompanying text.
71 ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.235(e) (Supp. 1985).
72
	 REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (Supp. 1985).
n ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 116, §§ 6-218, 6-321 to 6-327 (Supp. 1985).
74 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 143-b (McKinney Supp. 1986). In August, 1986, the states of New York
and California came to a tentative agreement which would permit New York and other bank
holding companies to enter California beginning in 1991. Kristof, California Banking Accord, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 23, 1986, at DI, col. 6.
as See, e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 5, § 803 (1985) (permitting out-of-state bank holding companies
to establish consumer credit banks in Delaware that are "operated in a manner and at a location
that is not likely to attract customers from the general public in this State ...."); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 51-16-40 to 51-16-41 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-392 (Supp. 1986) (permitting out-
of-state bank holding companies to establish financial service center banks in Virginia).
76 WASH. REV. CODE § 30.04.230(4)(b)(i) (Supp. 1986). Other states, such as Iowa, authorized
out-of-state bank holding companies already operating in-state banks to acquire others. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.29 (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 17,
§ 2510 (Smith-Hurd 1981). The out-of-state bank holding companies already present in the states




GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West 1984). See supra note 7 for text of the Massachu-
setts regional banking statute.
78 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 167A, § 2 (West 1984). The statute also contains a provision which
prevents a bank holding company from a non-New England state to leapfrog into Massachusetts
through Maine, which allows interstate banking without the regional restriction. Id.
79 1d.
8° CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-552 to 36-557 (1985). See supra note 9 for the text of the Connecticut
regional banking statute. The Northeast Bancorp Court considered the constitutionality of both the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes. 105 S. Ct. at 2553. Rhode Island also passed a regionally
restrictive interstate banking law, but its geographic limitation expires on July I, 1987. R.I. GEN.
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The New England states are not the only states to create a regional banking zone.
In 1984, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina passed reciprocal legis-
lation creating a southeastern banking region.'" Utah also has passed a regional banking
law which creates a western region of eleven states." This western region, however,
includes Alaska and Hawaii but excludes California." These states have enacted and
others are considering enacting some type of interstate banking statute mainly because
of the Supreme Court's Northeast Bancorp decision upholding the regional banking laws
of Massachusetts and Connecticut."
II. CASE LAW
Because regional banking laws are relatively new, courts have decided few cases
bearing directly on their constitutionality. Three cases decided prior to Northeast Bancorp
are instructive because they involved the constitutionality of state statutes restricting the
activities of out-of-state companies." These cases raise significant issues with respect to
regional banking laws and their relationship to the federal Bank Holding Company Act.
LAWS §§ 19-30-1 to 19-30.2 (Supp. 1985). The remaining New England states — New Hampshire
and Vermont — have not enacted any legislation which would allow out-of-state bank holding
companies into their states. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2549.
Bi
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.295 (West 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-620 to 7-1-625 (Supp. 1986);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-210 to 53-215 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-24-10 to 34.24-100 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 6.1-398 to 6.1-407. The Florida statute is entitled the "Regional
Reciprocal Banking Act of 1984" and authorizes bank holding companies from a southeastern
region consisting of twelve states and the District of Columbia to acquire Florida banks and hank
holding companies provided the home state of the acquiring bank holding company accords
equivalent privileges to Florida bank holding companies. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.295 (West 1984).
The Florida statute defines its southeastern "region" as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and the District of Columbia. The Georgia statute, also a reciprocal regional banking statute,
defines "Southern Region states - more narrowly than the Florida statute, including only the states
of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-620(10) (Supp. 1985). The North Carolina and
South Carolina statutes, also adopting regional reciprocal banking, create a region that is the same
as Florida's except that North and South Carolina add Kentucky to the region. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 53-210 (I 1) (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-24-20(12) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). Kentucky
has enacted a statute which permits acquisitions of in-state banks by out-of-state bank holding
companies based in states contiguous to Kentucky. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 287.900(6)(a) (Supp.
1986). In 1985, Virginia enacted a reciprocal regional banking statute and defined its region to
include the same states that North Carolina and South Carolina include in their southeastern
region. VA. CODE §§ 6.1-398 to 6.1-407. See also 1985 Ohio Laws § 1101.05 (admits out-of-state
bank holding companies from states contiguous to Ohio, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin; after three years this geo-
graphic limitation expires and Ohio will admit banks from any state).
82
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-102 (1985). The Utah statute permits acquisitions of Utah banks by
out-of-state banks or bank holding companies "only if such depository institution or out-of-state
depository institution holding company conducts its operations principally in Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada or Hawaii .. „" Id.
§ 7-1-102(2)(h).
Br
	 § 7-1-102. California tentatively plans to adopt a statute admitting banks from a western
region of states on July 1, 1987 and admitting banks from all other states, including New York, on
January 1, 1991. Kristof, supra note 74, at Dl, col. 6.
84 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2545.
" Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 511 F.2d 1288, 1292
July 1986]	 CASENOTES	 833
In Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 8 6 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1975 considered
the validity of an Iowa statute 87 permitting out-of-state bank holding companies already
owning Iowa banks to acquire other in-state banks.'" The practical effect of the statute
was to allow only one out-of-state bank holding company, Northwest Bancorporation of
Minnesota, to acquire Iowa banks.89 The association of Iowa Independent Bankers
argued that the statute violated the equal protection clause and conflicted with the
Douglas Amendment to the BHCA,""
The D.C. Circuit found no violation of the equal protection clause." In analyzing
the equal protection issue, the court first identified the applicable standard of review as
'whether the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 92 From
legislative history, the court determined that Iowa wanted to allow all preexisting bank
holding companies to compete equally but at the same time, prevent an influx of new
out-of-state bank holding companies." The Iowa Bankers court found that the Iowa
statute permitted a type of grandfathering that the Supreme Court has consistently
upheld."' The court concluded that the law was rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose and therefore constitutional under the equal protection clause."
In addition to finding that the Iowa statute did not violate the equal protection.
clause, the court of appeals held that the statute did not conflict with the Douglas
Amendment to the BHCA."" The court rejected the Iowa Bankers' argument that the
Douglas Amendment implicitly prohibits discrimination between out-of-state bank hold-
ing companies and requires states either to allow all out-of-state bank holding companies
to acquire in-state banks or to prohibit such acquisitions entirely. 97 The court suggested
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 87 (1975), and Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980),
are the only two cases prior to Northeast Bancorp which consider the validity of a state interstate
banking statute in light of the Douglas Amendment. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct.
1676 (1985), is the most recent in a long line of cases evaluating state tax statutes that discriminate
between out•of-state and in-state corporations.
"6 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
87 Id. at 1292. Iowa passed several statutes in 1972 regulating hank holding companies. The
Iowa Independent Bankers challenged the following statute:
Nothing in this division shall be construed to authorise a bank holding company which
is with respect to the state of Iowa an "out-of-state bank holding company" ... to
acquire any . interest in ... any bank in this state, unless such bank holding company
was on January 1, 1971, registered with the federal reserve hoard as a bank holding
company, and on that date owned at least two banks in this state.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1985). See Iowa Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1292.
" 511 F.2d at 1292.
89 Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1294, 1296. The D.C. Circuit held that Iowa Independent Bankers, an association of
over 400 banks in Iowa, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Iowa statute. Id. at
1293. The court first held that the plaintiff had standing to sue under the BHCA. Id. Then the
court found that the Iowa Independent. Bankers had the right to assert the rights of those out-of-
state hank holding companies allegedly being discriminated against by the Iowa statute. Id.
9i Id. at 1294-96.
92 Id. at 1294.
"Id. at 1294-95.
94 Id. at 1295.
95 See id. at 1295-96.
"' Id. at 1297. This is essentially a supremacy clause issue. See supra note 19.
97 Id.
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that this interpretation would conflict with section 7 of the BHCA, which reserves to the
states the powers they possessed before the Act." According to the court, the conflict
would arise because prior to the Act, the states were free to regulate in-state bank
acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding companies.`'`' The court concluded that the
Douglas Amendment intended to grant states the power to control the expansion of
bank holding companies across state lines.'" Therefore, the court found Iowa's regula-
tion consistent with federal banking law.'°'
While the D.C. Circuit Court's - interpretation of Iowa's interstate banking statute is
informative, the Iowa statute at issue is very narrowly drawn. The court recognized
Iowa's grandfather provision, distinguishing between holding companies already owning
Iowa banks and those not owning banks in Iowa, as furthering a legitimate state pur-
pose.'" It remained an open question, however, whether a statute classifying out-of-state
bank holding companies on different grounds, such as their home state, would also meet
equal protection standards.
While the Iowa Bankers case dealt with an equal protection issue and a statutory
construction question, Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc. raised a commerce clause
issue. 103 In Lewis, the United States Supreme Court in 1980 addressed the validity of a
Florida statute prohibiting out-of-state bank holding companies from owning Florida
businesses providing investment advisory services.R" The Court explained that although
banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern,' 05 they have
significant interstate attributes and therefore commerce clause limitations apply to state
regulations in these areas.' 46 The Court found that the Florida statute was "parochial"
because it overtly prohibited out-of-state bank holding companies from competing in
the Florida investment advisory services market. 107 The Lewis Court stated that it need
not decide if local favoritism rendered the Florida statute per se invalid under the
commerce clause, however, because the legislation was invalid under the commerce clause
balancing test." The Court held that no legitimate state interests justified the burden
on interstate commerce.'"
According to the Court, Florida's interests in discouraging economic concentration
and in protecting the citizenry from fraud did not justify the heavy burden on out-of-
9' Id. at 1296. See supra note 61.
99 51i F.2(1 at 1296.
,"" Id. at 1297.
Id. The Iowa Bankers case dealt with other issues, including standing, Iowa constitutional
issues, and jurisdiction, but none of these issues are relevant to this casenote. See id. at 1293-94,
1297-99,1300-02.
Id. at 1295.
'°5 Lewis v. LIT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
Id. at 31. While the Douglas Amendment prohibits bank holding companies from acquiring
banks across state lines without an authorizing state statute, it does not prohibit bank holding
companies from acquiring out-of-state businesses providing investment advisory services. See supra
note 68. See also Lewis, 447 U.S. at 47.
109 Lewis, 447 U.S. at 38.
155 Id.
'°' Id. at 39.
wn Id at 42. The Court's commerce clause balancing test weighs the burden imposed on
interstate commerce by the statute against the legitimate state purposes advanced by the statute.
See supra note 36.
1 "9 Lewis, 447 U.S. at 43.
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state bank holding companies."° Some intermediate form of regulation other than
complete exclusion, the Court reasoned, would have been as effective."' Moreover, the
state's interest in maximizing local control over financial institutions did not justify the
statute's discrimination. 1 12 The Court held this state interest to be parochial and in conflict
with the general principle that the commerce clause prohibits a state from using its
regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside competition."" 3
The Court further rejected the appellant's argument that the Douglas Amendment
and section 7 of the BHCA permitted Florida to impose such a burden on interstate
commerce. 14 The Douglas Amendment, the Court found, authorizes states to permit
bank holding companies to acquire banks across state lines, but does not authorize state
restrictions on bank holding company activities.° Moreover, the Court reasoned, the
Douglas Amendment applies only to acquisitions of banks and not to acquisitions of
nonbanking subsidiaries which the Florida statute regulates." 6 In addition, the Lewis
Court found that section 7 of the BHCA did not extend to the states any new powers
to regulate banking but merely preserved existing state regulations of bank holding
corn parties. " 7
The third case of significance to Northeast Bancorp does not involve banking law, as
do the two previously discussed cases, but rather, concerns state legislation discriminating
against out-of-state businesses. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, which was
decided in 1985, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an Alabama
statute imposing higher taxes on out-of-state insurance companies than on in-state
insurance companies." 8 Under the equal protection clause, the Court will sustain dis-
criminatory tax laws only if the discrimination is rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose."' The Metropolitan Life Court held that neither promoting domestic business
"° Id.
1, ' Id.
in See id. at 43-44.
1 3 Id. The Court further stated:
With regard to the asserted interest in promoting local control over financial institu-
tions, we doubt that the interest itself is entirely clear of any tinge of local parochialism.
In almost any Commerce Clause case, it would be possible for a State to argue that it
has an interest in bolstering local ownership, or wealth, or control of business enter-
prise. Yet these arguments are at odds with the general principle that the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power to protect its own citizens
from outside competition.
Id,
'I' Id. at 44-45,49.
15 Id. at 47. The Court stated:
The language of the statute establishes a genera] federal prohibition on the acquisition
or expansion of banking subsidiaries across state lines. The only authority granted to
the States is the authority to create exceptions to this general prohibition, that is, to
permit expansion of banking across state lines where it otherwise would he federally
prohibited.
Id. (emphasis in original).
" 6 /d.
" 7 /d. at 98-49. The court found that. Congress intended section 7 not only to preserve those
powers the states had in the dual banking system but also to clarify that the states could not enact
legislation inconsistent with the MICA. Id. at 49. See supra note 61 for the text of section 7.
" 8 Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676,1679 (1985).
"" Id. (citing Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,667—
68 (1981)). Prior to Western & Southern, courts often classified discriminatory state taxes as "privilege
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nor encouraging investment in domestic assets is a legitimate state purpose justifying the
domestic preference tax. 12° The Metropolitan Life Court concluded that Alabama's dis-
criminatory tax statute "constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the
Equal Protection Clause was intended to prevent.""' The Court stated that the "tax gives
the 'home team' an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to do
business within the state ...." 122
taxes" and held them to be immune front equal protection challenge. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 168, 181 (1869) (a state may impose conditions on the grant of the privilege to do business
within its borders); Lincoln Nail Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 678 (1945) ("privilege" taxes
imposed on foreign corporations are immune from equal protection challenge). In Western &
Southern, the Court traced its prior decisions concerning discriminatory state tax schemes. 451 U.S.
at 658-69. The Western & Southern Court found a conflict between the "privilege tax" doctrine
adopted in Paul v. Virginia and followed in Lincoln and other Supreme Court decisions which held
that a state may not impose unconstitutional conditions on the grant of a privilege. Id. at 657-58.
The Court cited cases both before and after Lincoln which held that states may not discriminate
against foreign corporations by imposing more onerous conditions on them than they impose on
domestic corporations. Id. at 662-69. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Clander, 337 U.S. 562, 571-
74 (1949) (Ohio ad valorem tax on intangible property of out-of-state corporations violated the
equal protection clause because it was not imposed on identical property of Ohio corporations);
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (Ohio tax imposed only on Ohio
residents and exempting nonresidents was subject to the equal protection clause and sustained);
WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 120 (1968) (New Jersey statute taxing nonprofit out-of-state
corporations and exempting New Jersey corporations was held to violate the equal protection
clause). In Western & Southern, the Court concluded that all state taxes discriminating between out-
of-state and in-state corporations "must bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose." 451
U.S. at 669.
Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684. Although the Court defined the issue before it in
Metropolitan Life as the constitutionality of the Alabama domestic preference tax statute, the actual
issue the Court addressed was much narrower. Id. at 1678. Because of the procedural status of the
case, the only question the Court considered was whether Alabama's purposes of promoting do-
mestic business and encouraging domestic investments were legitimate. Id. at 1680 & n.5. The
Court did not decide whether other purposes for the tax advanced by Alabama were legitimate or
whether the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to any of these purposes. Id. Never-
theless, the Court indicated that the constitutionality of the statute under the equal protection clause
depended on the legitimacy of the state purpose:
In the Equal Protection context, however, if the State's purpose is found to be legiti-
mate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally
related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish.
Id. at 1683.
121 Id. at 1681-82.
122
	
at 1682. The Court observed that equal protection restraints applied although the statute
imposed a burden which also would concern the commerce clause. Id. at 1683. The Metropolitan
Life Court noted that discriminatory tax laws place a burden on foreign insurers who desire to do
business within the state and thereby burden interstate commerce. Id. The McCarran-Ferguson
Act, however, authorized states to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce on insurance
companies:
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of
the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several states.
15 U,S.C. §.1011 (1982). The Metropolitan Life Court held that "[a]lthough the McCarran-Ferguson
Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit
in any way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause." Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1683.
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Thus, as the case discussion illustrates, a tension exists in the field of interstate
banking between what is authorized by federal law and what is prohibited by the com-
merce and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. While the D.C. Circuit in Iowa
Bankers found that the Douglas Amendment gave the states the power to regulate in-
state bank acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding companies,'" the Supreme Court
established in Lewis that state regulations must be consistent with the BHCA and within
the boundaries marked by the commerce clause.'" The Iowa Bankers court upheld a
narrowly drawn statute allowing interstate bank acquisitions under a grandfather pro-
vision,'" and the Lewis court struck down a broad, overtly protectionist statute prohib-
iting out-of-state bank holding companies from owning Florida investment advisory
services."° Metropolitan Life established that different treatment of out-of-state and in-
state corporations must bear a rational relation to some legitimate state purpose other
than simply proMoting domestic business and investments. 127 File question remained
after these cases whether state laws regulating interstate bank acquisitions according to
the acquiring bank's home state would fall within the authority granted by the Douglas
Amendment and the limitations imposed by the commerce and the equal protection
clauses.
III. NORTHEAST BANCORP V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
In Northeast Bancorp, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding the Massachusetts and Connecticut
regional banking laws.' 28
 The Court held that both state statutes were consistent with
federal law embodied in the Douglas Amendment and the BHCA.L 29
 The Court found
that because the Douglas Amendment authorized the state regional banking laws, it
exempted the state statutes from commerce clause scrutiny."° The Supreme Court
further found that legitimate concern for the independence of local banking institutions
motivated the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes and, therefore, these statutes did
not violate the equal protection clause."'
The Court first addressed the question whether the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes were consistent with the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act."2
 The Court initially looked to the language of the Douglas Amendment.'" The
123 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
1 " Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2556.
' 29 Id. at 2553.
10 1d. at 2554.
1 " Id. at 2555-56.
12 Id. at 2550. According to the Court, the analysis begins with this threshold question because
state laws inconsistent with federal statutory law are invalid. Id. While the opinion does not mention
specifically the supremacy clause, the Court essentially is reviewing a supremacy clause issue. See
supra note 13 for the text of the supremacy clause. In reviewing the Douglas Amendment, the
Court acknowledged that the Federal Reserve Board is an authoritative voice on the meaning of a
federal banking statute. 105 S. Ct. at 2551. The Supreme Court opinion additionally suggested that
the Board tnay have applied an unnecessarily strict standard when it sought a "clear authorization"
for regional interstate banking laws in the Douglas Amendment. Id. at 2551.
'" Id. See supra note 5 for the text of the Douglas Amendment.
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Court found that the Douglas Amendment clearly permits states to lift the federal ban
on interstate banking entirely, but noted that the Amendment does not indicate whether
states have the authority to lift the ban partially, such as on a regional basis)." The Court
observed that it need not decide what the language of the Amendment authorizes because
the legislative history of the Amendment provides a sufficient indication of Congress's
purposes.'" The Court recognized that one of the primary purposes of the Bank Holding
Company Act was to close a loophole in the McFadden Act's prohibition of interstate
branch banking.'y" Prior to the BHCA, banks circumvented the McFadden Act by cre-
ating a holding company which would purchase banks in different states)"
The Court next addressed the legislative history of the Douglas Amendment.'" The
Court noted that policies of community control and local responsiveness of banks led
the House of Representatives to prohibit completely interstate bank acquisitions in their
version of the BHCA.'" The bill reported out by the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency permitted interstate bank acquisitions conditioned only on approval by the
Federal Reserve Board."° According to the Court, some Congressional members who
perceived the flat ban in the House bill offensive to states' rights therefore supported
the Senate Committee's bill."'
The Douglas Amendment, the Court found, was a compromise that accommodated
those concerned about states' rights 142 by giving states the flexibility to retain the ban on
interstate acquisitions of their banks, lift the ban entirely, or lift the ban to whatever
degree the state desired."" The Court quoted Senator Douglas's explanation that his
amendment would permit bank holding companies to acquire banks in other states "'only
to the degree that State laws expressly permit them.''S 44 Senator Douglas analogized his
proposed amendment to the McFadden Act, the Court noted." 5 The Court reasoned
that the McFadden Act, which subjected national banks to state branching restrictions,
'" Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2551.
1 " Id.
Id. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
'" Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2551.
136 Id. The Court noted that because the Senate debate is the only legislative history available,
the comments of individual legislators "carry substantial weight." Id.
139 14. The House enacted the BHCA in 1955. Id.
"0 Id. The Court noted that the large bank holding companies seeking further expansion
favored the original Senate bill. Id.
" I Id. at 2552.
142 Id. The Court quotes Senator Douglas, who proposed the Amendment: "[o]ur amendment
would prohibit bank holding companies from purchasing banks in other states unless such purchases
by out-of-State holding companies were specifically permitted by law in such States." Id. (quoting
102 CONC. REC. 6860 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
' 43 '105 S. Ct. at 2552.
144 Id. (quoting 102 Cone. REC. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
145 Id. The Court quoted Senator Douglas in part:
[B]y the McFadden Act and other measures, national banks have been permitted to
open branches only to the degree permitted by State laws and State authorities.
I may say that what our amendment aims to do is to carry over into the field of
holding companies the same provisions which already apply for branch banking under
the McFadden Act — namely, our amendment will permit out-of-State holding com-
panies to acquire banks in other States only to the degree that State laws expressly
permit them; and that is the provision of the McFadden Act.
105 S. Ct. at 2552 (quoting 102 CONC. REC. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
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gave the states more than an "all-or-nothing choice with respect to branch banking." 146
Therefore, the Court concluded, Congress could not have intended the Douglas Amend-
ment to offer the states only an all-or-nothing choice with respect to interstate banking. "7
After concluding that Congress intended to allow states to lift partially the ban on
interstate banking, the Court examined the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes. "
Observing that the purpose of the Douglas Amendment was to retain local, community
control over banking, the Court held that the regional banking laws furthered the
objectives of federal banking law." 9 The Court recognized that the states were seeking
an alternative to full-scale interstate banking in an effort to retain local control over
banking. 150 The Connecticut Legislature, the Court noted, viewed its regional banking
law as a precursor to a broader interstate banking law. 151 This kind of flexibility, the
Court concluded, was precisely what the Douglas Amendment contemplated when it
gave the states the power to allow interstate bank acquisitions.' 52
Having found the state statutes consistent with federal statutory law, the Court next
addressed the constitutionality of the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes.' 53 The
Court noted that regional banking laws would violate the commerce clause if Congress
had remained silent on the subject.'" The Court found, however, that Congress autho-
rized these laws when it enacted the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA.' 55 Specifically,
the Court. stated, "[w]hen Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes
are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Therefore, the
Court concluded that the challenged laws are constitutional under the commerce
clause. 157
146 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552.
147 Id.
' 4" Id. at 2553.
149 Id.
"u Id. The Northeast Bancorp opinion quotes a Report to the General Assembly of the State of
Connecticut made by a commission which proposed the regional banking law. See infra note 238.
The excerpts quoted indicate that the Connecticut legislature designed the law Co promote "local
ownership and control of banks" and "the preservation of a close relationship between those in our
communities who need credit and those who provide credit." Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553
(quoting REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 4 App. in No. 84-
4047, (CA 2), at 1230, 1240-41 (1983)).
' 51 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2553.
'" Id.
'" Id. at 2553-56.
154 Id. at 2553-54. The Court cites Lewis, 447 U.S. at 39-44 (1980), and Sporhase y. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 94 l (1982), for the proposition that the dormant commerce clause plainly
would prohibit states from passing regional banking laws such as the ones in question. 105 S. Ct.
at 2553-54.
'" Id. at 2554.
Ise Id .
'" Id. After disposing of the commerce clause argument, the Court then turned to the issue of
whether the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes violated the compact clause of the Constitution.
Id. For the text of the compact clause, see supra note 47. The Court expressed skepticism as to
whether these regional banking laws amounted to a compact. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2554.
As evidence supporting the existence of an agreement, the Court cited the similarity of the two
statutes; both statutes require reciprocity and both state legislatures favor the establishment of
regional banking within New England. The Court noted that evidence exists showing cooperation
among legislators, officials, and bankers in Massachusetts and Connecticut in studying the idea and
lobbying for the laws. Id. As evidence suggesting that no agreement exists, the Court stated that
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Finally, the Court reviewed the equal protection issue.'" The Court distinguished
the regional banking laws at issue in Northeast Bancorp from the domestic preference tax
laws at issue in Metropolitan Life.' 59 The Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes do not
favor in-state corporations over out-of-state corporations, the Court reasoned, but favor
New England based corporations over corporations from non-New England states. 16° In
addition, the Court noted the tradition of 'dispersed control of banking" in this
country' 6 ' and found that banking is of "profound local concern."' 62 The Court held
that Connecticut's purpose of increasing bank competition while preserving a close
relationship between those in the community who need credit and those who provide
credit was legitimate. 163 The Court also approved of the Connecticut Legislature's con-
cern that unrestricted interstate banking would threaten the independence of local
banks.'" The Court concluded that the regional banking laws did not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'"
justice O'Connor, who had dissented from the Court's holding in Metropolitan Life,
concurred in a separate opinion in Northeast Bancorp.' 66 Justice O'Connor agreed that
the regional banking laws did not violate the commerce, compact, or equal protection
clauses, but wrote a separate opinion to point out some inconsistencies. 167 justice O'Con-
nor addressed the inconsistency between the Court's equal protection analysis in this
case and in Metropolitan Life.'" Barring the banks of forty-four states, Justice O'Connor
contended, is no less discriminatory than Alabama's taxing insurance companies of forty-
nine states at a higher rate.“'9 It is not logical, Justice O'Connor observed, for the equal
there is no joint organization to enforce the banking laws, neither statute is conditioned on the
other state's law, and each state is free to modify or repeal its law without affecting the other. Id.
In addition, the other New England states encompassed by the alleged compact have different
banking laws. See supra note 80.
The Court, however, did not resolve this issue because it found that even if there was a compact,
it did not infringe upon federal supremacy and therefore was not an unconstitutional compact.
105 S. Ct. at 2554. The compact clause prohibits only those agreements that are "directed to the
formation of any combination tending to increase the political power in the States, which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." Id. (quoting Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 ( I 893)). The Court concluded that the state statutes did not infringe
upon federal supremacy since they were authorized by the Douglas Amendment. Id.
l" Id. at 2555. The Court reviewed the equal protection clause although the petitioners did
not address the issue in their petition for certiorari or in their briefs. Id. After the Supreme Court's
decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. a. Ward, the petitioners filed a supplemental brief requesting
the Court to review the equal protection issue. Id. The Court agreed to do so because the Federal
Reserve Board and the court of appeals had reviewed the issue and because it did not want to leave
a "cloud" over other pending bank acquisition applications. Id. at 2556.
159 Id.
16° Id. at 2555. The Court acknowledged that these laws may be said to discriminate against
corporations from states not in the New England region. Id.
""I Id. The Court noted that this country has approximately 15,000 commercial banks, whereas
many countries are "dominated by a handful of centralized banks." Id.
' 62 Id. (quoting Lewis, 447 U.S. at 38).
' 63 See id. at 2555-56.
164 Id. at 2555.
'65 Id. at 2556.
166
	 at 2556-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168 Id. See Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1676.
105 S. Ct. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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protection clause to condemn a state "home team" but not condemn a regional "home
team."'"
Justice O'Connor compared the businesses of insurance and banking, finding them
both to be recognized as local concerns and historically regulated by the states)" The
majority opinion had distinguished the regional banking laws on the grounds that they
have a valid purpose: "to preserve a close relationship between those in the community
who need credit and those who provide credit."'" Justice O'Connor pointed out, how-
ever, that although Alabama also advanced an interest in preserving local institutions
responsive to local needs, the Court nevertheless did not uphold its insurance tax." 5
According to Justice O'Connor, the Court should not invalidate classifications under the
equal protection clause designed to encourage domestic businesses where Congress has
authorized the states to enact such laws free from commerce clause restraints. 14 Justice
O'Connor concluded that the equal protection clause should permit economic regulations
that differentiate between local and out-of-state groups because local groups are often
of legitimate interest to the state. 15
IV. THE VALIDITY OF REGIONAL BANKING LAWS
A. The Douglas Amendment
In Northeast Bancorp, the Supreme Court failed to strike down discriminatory state
banking statutes which violate the equal protection clause. Although the language and
legislative history of the Douglas Amendment to the federal Bank Holding Company
Act indicate that Congress intended to defer to the states with respect to regional
interstate banking, a federal authorization does not free the state statutes from equal
protection scrutiny. Under the equal protection clause, states may enact interstate bank-
ing statutes that further legitimate state purposes, but economic protectionism is not a
legitimate state purpose. Because the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes are de-
signed to foster the growth of local banks by insulating them from competition with
large money-center banks, the Court should have held these statutes invalid under the
equal protection clause.
With the enactment of the federal Bank Holding Company Act in 1956, Congress
brought bank holding companies under federal control.'" Under the supremacy clause,
any state statute regulating bank holding companies must be consistent with federal
bank holding company legislation to be valid,'" The Douglas Amendment to the BHCA
1701d,
17 ' Id.
'" Id. at 2555.
' 73 Id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, this purpose survives
as one of the "15 additional purposes'' the Court remanded for reconsideration, Id. (citing Metro-
politan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1680 n.5).
174 105 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'" Id. at 2557 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982). See supra notes 3 & 61.
1 " See supra note 13 for the text of the supremacy clause. Federal legislation prevails over state
legislation when an "act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State."
Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912) (dictum). See also Northeast Bancorp, l05 S. Ct. at 2550
(The proposed acquisitions authorized by state law must he consistent with the Douglas Amendment
or they are invalid). See generally L. 'rimy., supra note 14, § 6-24.
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prohibits interstate bank acquisitions unless the home state of the target bank authorizes
the acquisition by statute.'" Thus, a state law admitting out-of-state bank holding com-
panies must be consistent with the Douglas Amendment to be valid. 178
 It is not imme-
diately clear, however, what type of state laws Congress contemplated when it enacted
the Douglas Amendment.
There are four possible interpretations of the Douglas Amendment. The first pos-
sibility is that Congress intended to preempt the field of interstate banking and to prohibit
any state law authorizing interstate bank acquisitions.' 8° Second, the Douglas Amendment
could be viewed as offering the states an all-or-nothing choice of either allowing full-
scale interstate banking or prohibiting it entirely.' 81
 Third, the Douglas Amendment
could be interpreted as authorizing states to pass only interstate banking statutes that
are evenhanded and nondiscriminatory.' 82 This view is the interpretation most commonly
adopted by critics of the Supreme Court's Northeast Bancorp decision and those opposed
to state regional banking legislation.'" The fourth possible interpretation and the one
adopted by the Supreme Court in Northeast Bancorp is that the Douglas Amendment
represents a congressional deferral to state policy with regard to the regulation of out-
of-state bank holding companies desiring acquisition of in-state banks.' 8'
The first possibility — that Congress intended to preempt the field of bank holding
company interstate acquisitions — is at odds with the language of the Douglas Amend-
ment. Preemption would invalidate all state regulation of bank holding company
expansion 185 and make the Douglas Amendment's prohibition on interstate bank acqui-
sitions absolute. The Douglas Amendment, however, explicitly provides for state statutes
authorizing an out-of-state bank holding company to acquire a domestic bank. 188 The
Senate rejected the House bill's flat ban on bank holding company expansion across state
lines and instead adopted the language of the Douglas Amendment, which, was later
assented to by the House.' 87 The Amendment states that the Federal Reserve Board
shall not approve interstate bank acquisitions "unless the acquisition ... is specifically
'76 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). See supra note 21.
19 See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2550.
180 See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
,81 See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. See also Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552.
182 See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
182 See infra note 195 for authors advocating this interpretation.
"4 See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text. See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
1 " See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 6-25, at 384 ("If Congress has validly decided to
'occupy the field' for the federal government, state regulations will be invalidated."). See, e.g., Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 450 U.S. 519, 539, 543 (1977) (Court held that congressional provision
forbidding imposition of regulations regarding labeling, packaging, or requiring of ingredients
different from those made under federal statutes preempted state labeling requirement with respect
to packaged bacon); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301 (1961) (Court held that "Congress, in
legislating ... preempted the field and left no room for any supplementary state regulation . . .").
' 8'i 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1956). See supra note 5 for the text of the Douglas Amendment.
187 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. As enacted by the House in 1955, the BHCA
contained a flat ban on interstate bank acquisitions. Id. The Douglas Amendment, adopted on the
Senate floor, modified this ban by giving states the prerogative to lift it. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
See CONG. Rae. 6858-60 (1956). It would be illogical to conclude that although Congress explicitly
authorized the state statutes lifting the prohibition on interstate banking, Congress intended to
preempt the field.
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authorized by the statute laws of the State ...."' 88 An interpretation of the Douglas
Amendment as a ban on all interstate bank acquisitions would render the "unless" clause
quoted above meaningless. The statutory language indicates that Congress intended the
states to decide when and if to permit out-of-state bank holding companies within their
borders. 189
The legislative history of the Douglas Amendment must be examined to determine
what type of state laws authorizing interstate bank acquisitions Congress intended when
it enacted the BHCA. If the regional banking statutes are inconsistent with congressional
intent embodied in the Douglas Amendment, they will be unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause. Unfortunately, the Douglas Amendment was proposed and adopted
on the Senate floor; therefore, its legislative history is confined to the Senate debate. 198
The limited legislative history, however, suggests that Congress intended to give the
states broad discretion with respect to interstate banking statutes.
The second possible interpretation of the Douglas Amendment — that Congress
intended only to allow the states an all-or-nothing approach — is not supported by the
record of the Senate debate.' 8 ' There is no mention of such a limit, and statements of
Senators during their debate indicate that the Senate contemplated that the states and
the Federal Reserve Board might authorize such acquisitions on a limited basis. Senator
Robertson mentioned the need for interstate bank acquisitions to be considered on an
individual hasis.' 92 Senator Douglas stated that his "amendment will permit out-of-state
holding companies to acquire banks in other States only to the degree that State laws
expressly permit them."'" Upon a review of the legislative history, both the D.C. Circuit
188 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).
' 89 The legislative history also undermines such an interpretation. See infra notes 192-93 and
accompanying text.
'9° Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2551.
' 91 See 102 CONG. REC. 6750-58, 6854-62 (1956). See also Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552
(Court cited some of Senator Douglas's comments in support of its conclusion that the Douglas
Amendment "did not simply leave to each State a choice one way or another — either to permit or
bar interstate acquisitions of local banks — but ... allow[ed] each State flexibility in its approach").
192 102 CONG. REC. 6752 (1956). Senator Robertson expressed his disagreement with the House
bill's ban on interstate bank acquisitions and stated that "lain absolute prohibition of that nature
would constitute a Federal freeze on future expansion without regard to the merits of each individual
case." Id. (emphasis added). Senator Robertson then quoted Senator Maybank:
It is conceivable, for instance, that a State might seek for its banks financial assistance
which an oul-of-state holding company might be able to render. Yet a State would be
powerless to do so if proposals for a flat prohibition by Federal law against expansion
of bank holding companies across State lines existed.
Id. (statement of Sen. Robertson) (quoting Sen. Maybank) (emphasis added). These statements
suggest that giving authority to the states to control bank holding company expansion was not
meant to be an all-or-nothing choice.
LOS Id. at 6858 (statement of Sen. Douglas) (emphasis added). Senator Dotiglas may have believed
that under his amendment a state would have the authority to admit one hank holding company:
"UP' and when individual States permitted a bank holding company front another State to acquire
assets across State lines, then the Federal Reserve Board would have final jurisdiction in those cases
as well." Id. at 6850 (emphasis added). Senator Payne's statement also suggests that the states could
do more under the Douglas Amendment than prohibit interstate banking or lift the bar completely:
"[t]his amendment would require that state legislatures pass specific legislation authorizing bank
holding companies from another Slate to acquire interests in State hanks located within its borders."
Id. at 6862 (statement of Sen. Payne) (emphasis added).
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in Iowa Bankers and the Supreme Court in Northeast Bancorp found that the Douglas
Amendment did not simply grant the states an all-or-nothing choice with respect to
interstate banking.'"
It is similarly unlikely that Congress only intended to permit the states to lift the
prohibition on interstate banking in a strictly evenhanded manner, as the third possible
interpretation of the Douglas Amendment would require. Proponents of this third
possible interpretation argue that the states are not permitted to lift the ban on interstate
banking on a regional basis but only may lift the ban according to neutral criteria such
as size.'" This is an appealing argument to those opposed to regional banking laws, but
it is not supported by the language or legislative history of the Douglas Amendment.
The Senate debate's emphasis on states' rights supports the fourth possible interpretation
of the amendment — an unrestricted grant of power to the states. Although Senator
Douglas proposed his amendment because he believed that "further expansion of hold-
ing companies in the field of banking would be contrary to the public interest,"'" he
suggested that his amendment would appeal to "Lajnyone who favors States rights." 197
Senator Payne also stressed that states have a primary interest in controlling bank holding
company expansion across state lines.'" This emphasis on states' rights indicates that
Congress intended to give the states broad discretion over interstate bank acquisitions.
Senator Douglas's analogy between his amendment and the McFadden Act provides
additional support for an interpretation of the Douglas Amendment which involves a
deferral to state policy.' 29 The general rule regarding banking regulation is that the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over national banks and the states have
exclusive jurisdiction over state banks. 2" With respect to geographic expansion in bank-
ing, however, state law has prevailed. 20 ' The McFadden Act authorized national banks
to branch, but only to the same extent that stale statutes permit state banks to branch. 202
Under the McFadden Act, Congress deferred to state policy with respect to geographic
limitations on bank branching. 2"3 Senator Douglas emphasized that his amendment
'" See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Iowa Bankers case. See
supra text accompanying note 147 for the Supreme Court's findings in Northeast Bancorp on this
issue.
'" See generally Golembe & }Cumin, supra note 15, at 993; Note, supra note 11, at 283; Note,
Regional Banking Laws, supra note 15, at 548; Note, State Statutes, supra note 15, at 380.
' 96 102 CONG. Rec. 6859 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
' 97 Id. at 6860 (statement of Sen. Douglas). See also id. at 6752 (statement of Sen. Robertson)
(quoting Sen. Maybank).
108 Id. at 6862 (statement of Sen. Payne). Senator Payne stated that "the control of expansion
of bank holding companies across State lines into State banks is a matter of primary concern to the
State governments and is an area best left to their discretion rather than to have it solely under the
jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board." Id.
199 Id. at 6858 (statement of Sen. Douglas).
200 See id. at 6861 (statement of Sen. Bricker).
201 H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). The report states:
In the past, Congress has repeatedly been urged both to permit national banks to
carry on branch banking across State lines and to allow them to operate interstate
branches without regard to State branch banking laws. The Congress however has
steadfastly respected the rights of the States to specify the extent to which branch
banking shall be practiced within their respective borders.
Id.
202 12 U,S.C. 36(c) (1982). See supra note 57.
209 See supra note 57.
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aimed "to carry over into the field of holding companies the same provisions which
already apply for branch banking under the McFadden Act — namely, our Amendment
will permit out-of-State holding companies to acquire banks in other States only to the
degree that State laws expressly permit them . ..." 2°4 The Senate debate shows that
Congress intended to defer to state policy with respect to interstate bank acquisitions by
bank holding companies just as they deferred to state policy with respect to branching.
Reading a requirement of evenhandedness into the Douglas Amendment's author-
ization to states to admit out-of-state bank holding companies would be inconsistent with
the language and legislative history of the Amendment. The Douglas Amendment simply
states that interstate bank acquisitions are prohibited unless the acquisition is authorized
specifically by state law. 2"5 Its language is broad and includes no reference to restrictions
on a state's power to admit out-of-state bank holding companies.
Neither the Jowa Bankers court nor the Northeast Bancorp Court found an implicit
requirement of evenhandedness in the Douglas Amendment. The D.C. Circuit observed
that the Iowa Independent Bankers argued that "implicit in the Douglas amendment is
a prohibition against discrimination between out-of-state bank holding companies." 206
This is the same argument that those opposing the Massachusetts and Connecticut
regional banking statutes make. The Iowa Bankers court found that "the intent of the
Douglas Amendment was to assure that the states had sufficient power to control the
expansion of bank holding companies across state lines so that such expansion would
not contravene state policy."507 The court of appeals concluded that the petitioner's
interpretation of the Douglas Amendment "would rob the states of this power." 208 Ac-
cording to the court, "the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Congress intended to
bar discriminations of the sort found in [the Iowa statute]," and therefore the court held
that there was no conflict between the Iowa statute and federal statutory law. 209 The
Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp, similarly concluded that the Douglas Amendment
offered states flexibility and permitted them to take a variety of approaches to interstate
banking.210
Proponents of the theory that the Douglas Amendment authorizes the states to lift
the ban on interstate banking but does not authorize the states to do so on a discrimi-
natory basis favoHng a certain region, rely on the assumption that Congress did not
contemplate the possibility of states lifting the prohibition on interstate acquisitions on
a regional basis. 2 " This assumption is necessary because the Douglas Amendment con-
tains such broad language authorizing the states to enact statutes permitting interstate
20" 102 CONG. REG. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
200 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1956). See supra note 5 for the text of the Douglas Amendment.
200
	 Bankers, 511 F.2d at 1296.
207 Id. at 1297.
208 Id.
289 Id. For further discussion or the Iowa Bankers case, see supra notes 86-102 and accompanying
text. In addition, the Supreme Court in Lewis explained that the Douglas Amendment granted
states "the authority to create exceptions to this general prohibition, that is to permit expansion of
banking across state lines where it otherwise would he federally prohibited." Lewis, 447 U.S. at 47
(emphasis in original) (Court holds that a Florida statute imposing restrictions on out-of-state bank
holding companies greater than those imposed or authorized by the Douglas Amendment violates
the commerce clause).
210 Northeasi Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
41 See supra note 195.
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acquisitions. If Congress were aware that regional legislation might develop and yet still
approved the broad language in the Douglas Amendment, then this theory that region-
alism is not permitted fails.
Legislative history shows that members of Congress were aware that a regional
approach to interstate banking had considerable support. A House report of 1955
acknowledged the continued support for the expansion of branch banking on a "trade
area" or "Federal Reserve district basis." 2 ' 2 Representatives from banks testified at Senate
hearings about the benefits of allowing banks to serve "trade territor(ies]" as opposed to
restricting their services within state borders. 2 " Despite Congress's knowledge that sup-
port existed for banking expansion on a trade area basis, both the House and the Senate
approved of the Douglas Amendment's very general grant of power to the states.
Congress's knowledge of the interest in regional approaches to banking, together with
the broad language of the Douglas Amendment, suggest that the Amendment was
intended to permit state statutes admitting out-of-state bank holding companies on a
regional or trade-area baSis. Thus, the Connecticut and Massachusetts regional banking
laws are consistent with federal legislation embodied in the Douglas Amendment and
constitutional under the supremacy clause. 2 "
219 A House committee report that accompanied the House version of the BHCA noted:
Repeatedly Congress has been urged to break down the restrictions in the national
banking law regarding branches of national banks. Congress has been urged to permit
branches, regardless of State bank laws, on a trade area basis, or an interstate or
Federal Reserve district basis, and in fact on a nationwide basis.
H.R. R F.P. No. 609. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1955).
2 " During this Senate hearing, a witness from a Minneapolis bank explained that he was
opposed to an absolute ban on interstate bank acquisitions because such a ban would limit the
banking services provided by Minneapolis bank holding companies to the region including Min-
nesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana. Control of Bank Holding Companies, 1955: Hearings
on S. 880, S. 2350, and H.R. 6227 Before the Subcomm. un Banking of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1955) (statement of Ellwood O. Jenkins, First Bank Stock Corp.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota). Mr. Jenkins stated that ''Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Montana form a trade territory which looks to the Twin Cities as its business, commercial, and
financial capital." Id. (emphasis added). He stated that North Dakota, Montana, and South Dakota
do not have the banking capital they need in light of their expanding economy. Id. at 135-36. He
suggested that hank holding companies are particularly useful because they can supply needed
banking capital. Id. Mr. Jenkins told the committee that "[f]or 26 years, our corporation through
its affiliated banks has served our 4 -state area with a fine banking service." Id. al 136. Prior to the
1956 Bank Holding Company Act, holding companies were not subject to federal regulation and
therefore multistate bank holding companies developed in a number of areas. See supra notes 58 &
69 and accompanying text.
Another witness before this same committee noted that "a trade-area approach such as a Federal
Reserve district for instance ... could be defended quite logically whereas State lines are historical
accident. Massachusetts is a little State because it is an old State, and why should that historical
accident serve today to penalize them?" Id, at 140 (statement of John T. Noonan, Baystate Corp.,
Boston, Massachusetts).
2 ' 4 if courts found the state statutes authorizing regional bank acquisitions inconsistent with
federal law, they would hold the statutes invalid under the supremacy clause. See supra note 177
and accompanying text. The laws, therefore, would not be sufficient under the Douglas Amendment
to remove the Amendment's general prohibition on all interstate bank acquisition. Northeast Bancorp,
105 S. Ct. at 2550.
Legislative history also indicates that Congress knew of the discriminatory effects of the Douglas
Amendment. See 102 CONG. REC. 6860-61 (1955) (statements of Sens. Bennett and Bricker). Senator
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Congress asserted in the Douglas Amendment its intent to give the states authority
to control out-of-state bank holding company acquisitions of their local banks. The
money-center banks and several commentators contend, however, that the Amendment
does not expressly authorize the states to distinguish between out-of-state bank holding
companies in lifting the Douglas Amendment's ban on interstate acquisitions. 215 They
contend that without express authorization, the state regional banking statutes are subject
to the commerce clause, and because the statutes discriminate in interstate commerce,
they are unconstitutional. 216 This argument, however, relies on cases in which there was
no federal statute directly on point authorizing the state action in question. In South-
Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, for example, the Supreme Court held that
an Alaska statute requiring Alaskan timber to be processed within Alaska violated the
commerce clause. 217 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's finding that there
was congressional authorization for the Alaska statute. 218 The Court rejected Alaska's
argument that federal policy with respect to timber from federal lands impliedly au-
thorizes its statute. 2 ' 2 The Supreme Court explained that "a clear expression of approval
by Congress" is necessary and refused to infer congressional approval of the state statute
regarding state lands from Congress's policies with respect to federal lands. 22° In the
Bennett objected to the Douglas Amendment, noting that it "requireisl discrimination in interstate
commerce." Id. at 6860 (statement of Sen. Bennett). Senator Bennett explained:
The net effect of the amendment is to require every State ... to discriminate in favor
of such corporations that may be resident in their State and against bank holding
companies resident in any other State and requires affirmative legislation to remove
the discrimination.
Id.
The Senate and House approved of the Douglas Amendment knowing that it prohibited bank
holding companies from engaging in interstate commerce in the absence of appropriate state
legislation. if Congress endorsed a plan requiring states to discriminate against all out-of-state bank
holding companies, it is likely that in permitting states to lift this ban on interstate bank acquisitions,
Congress intended to allow states to discriminate among out-of-state bank holding companies. See
id, Any differentiations made between out-of-state bank holding companies by state statutes, how-
ever, must he rationally related to a legitimate state purpose under the equal protection clause. See
infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 195.
276
 Id. In South-Central Timber I)ev. Inc. a. Wunnicke, the Supreme Court required "unmistakably
clear" congressional intent to exempt a state regulation from the limitations imposed on state action
by the commerce clause. 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). In Northeast Bancorp, the Court acknowledged that
without congressional authorization, regional banking laws would be invalid under the commerce
clause. 105 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
517 467 U.S. at 100.
2" Id. at 92-93.
219 Id. at 92.
22° Id. at 92-93. In two other Supreme Court cases often cited for the proposition that express
congressional authorization is required to remove state statutes from commerce clause scrutiny,
there was no federal statute directly on point. In these two cases, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 960 (1982), and New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that congressional intent to remove state legislation from commerce clause
scrutiny was not "expressly stated." In Sporehase, the Court rejected Nebraska's contention that
Congress authorized the state to restrict interstate use of its ground water by its practice of deferring
to state water law and its failure to create a federal water law. 458 U.S. at 958-60. In New England
Power Co., the Court refused to find that a "savings clause" of the Federal Power Act authorized
New Hampshire's restriction on the interstate flow of privately produced electricity. 455 U.S. at
341. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (The Act "shall not ... deprive a State of its
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case of interstate banking, there is no need to infer congressional approval of state
statutes from federal policy. A federal banking statute on point provides that no interstate
bank acquisitions shall take place unless the states by statute authorize such acquisitions. 2"
The Douglas Amendment contains exactly the type of authorization the Court looks for
when it requires a "clear expression of approval by Congress." 222 It is sufficient for
Congress to specify the type of commerce it is authorizing the states to regulate. It would
be impractical to require Congress to consider all variations of state statutes or even to
specify expressly that the state is free of commerce clause restraints. 223
B. Regional Banking Laws and the Equal Protection Clause
While Congress probably intended to defer to the states and permit them to regulate
the admission of out-of-state bank holding companies into their borders, the states must
lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted
across a State line.").
In the BHCA, there is a savings clause similar to that contained in the Federal Power Act which
preserves existing state regulations of bank holding companies. See supra note 61. The Douglas
Amendment, however, goes much further than a savings clause preserving existing state law. It
specifically authorizes the states to enact statutes admitting out-of-state bank holding companies.
See supra note 5 for text of the Douglas Amendment.
22 ' 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d). See .supra note 5.
222 See South -Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 92.
223 Congressional power to authorize states to discriminate overtly in interstate commerce has
never been challenged but nevertheless is at odds with the policies underlying the commerce clause.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) ("The power of Congress over commerce
exercised entirely without reference to coordinated action of the states is not restricted, except as
the Constitution expressly provides, by any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against
interstate commerce and in favor of local trade."). The Constitution does not forbid Congress from
discriminating in interstate commerce and favoring local interests. Id. The Douglas Amendment's
complete prohibition of bank acquisitions across state lines is a great burden on interstate commerce
and an example of Congress's plenary power over commerce.
Moreover, Congress may confer on states the power to regulate interstate commerce in a
manner that they otherwise would not enjoy. Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 652 (citing Lewis, 447
U.S. at 44). Authorizing states to form banking zones and to discriminate against banks from states
they disfavor nevertheless seems inconsistent with the concept of the federal system established by
the Constitution:
The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less par-
ochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of several states must
sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union
and not in division.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrel, 424 U.S. 366, 380-81 (1976) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)). At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the framers
were very concerned about discriminatory trade policies among the states and regional factionalism.
THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-40 (Cooke ed. 1961) ("Each ... separate confederacy ... would
pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself'. This would occasion distinctions, preferences
and exclusions which would beget discontent."). In discussing the reasons for the adoption of the
Constitution, Madison stated: "Nt seems to be feared that the Northern States will oppress the
trade of the South .... The middle States may apprehend ... combinations against them between
the Eastern and Southern States." Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, reprinted in
Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 584-87 (1927). Under current constitutional law, congressional authority to delegate
power over interstate commerce is unchallenged. See Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 652. Never-
theless, perhaps the Court should interpret the Constitution to impose a limit on Congress's
authority to delegate to the states the power 1.-.) discriminate in interstate commerce in light of the
underlying policies of the commerce clause and the federal system.
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regulate within the scope of the equal protection clause. 224 The equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment protects persons 225 from discrimination by the states. 225
Regional banking legislation does not classify on the basis of a suspect classification 227
nor infringe upon a fundamental right 223
 and is consequently subject to the rational basis
standard of review. 229
 Under this rational basis test, regional banking laws must be
"rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest." 230
Although the Supreme Court has not defined legitimate state purpose, it has held
that state legislation that purposely discriminates and is not supported by a valid state
interest is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause."' The Metropolitan Life
Court evaluated parochial state legislation under the equal protection clause. 232 The
Metropolitan Life Court found that Alabama had erected barriers to out-of-state insurance
companies to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home and to encourage
capital investments in Alabama assets."' The Court declared that this parochial discrim-
ination is precisely the type of discrimination that the equal protection clause was in-
tended to prevent. 234 The Metropolitan Life Court emphasized that the equal protection
clause always has forbidden a state from discriminating in favor of its own residents
224 See supra note 16 for the text of the equal protection clause.
223
 A corporation falls within the definition of "person" for the purposes of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1683 n.9; Western & Southern,
451 U.S. at 660 n.12; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1888).
226 Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1683.
727 See J . NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448-50 (1978) [hereinafter
NowAxi. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and subject to "most rigid
scrutiny").
223
 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (courts subject classifi-
cations which invade or restrain "fundamental rights and liberties," such as the right to vote, to
close scrutiny). See generally NOwAK, supra note 227, at 816-31.
229
 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (Under the equal protection clause,
economic regulations that do not impinge fundamental rights or draw inherently suspect distinctions
are constitutional if rationally related to a legitimate state interest.). See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S.
Ct. at 2556 (Court applied the traditional rational basis standard of review).
2" See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 667-68
(the statute is sustained if "its classification is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate state
purpose").
"' See Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 669. In Western & Southern, the Supreme Court explained:
In determining whether a challenged classification is rationally related to achievement
of a legitimate state purpose, we must answer two questions: (1) Does the challenged
legislation have a legitimate purpose? and (2) Was it reasonable for the lawmakers to
believe that use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?
Id. In Metropolitan Life, the Court stated: "[i[n the equal protection context, however, if the State's
purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to
be rationally related to that purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish." 105 S. Ct. at
1683. See also Note, Regional Banking Laws and the Equal Protection Clause, 84 COLUM. L. Rev. 2025,
2029-32 (1985).
For example, in "Lobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 57 (1982), the Supreme Court struck down an
Alaska statute which provided for payments of dividends by the states to its citizens according to
the length of their residence in the state. The Court held that this statute violated the equal
protection clause because Alaska's purpose of rewarding their long-term residents for past contri-
butions was "not a legitimate purpose." Id. at 63. See also Note, supra, at 2030.
232 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
"3 Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1681.
" Id. at 1681-82.
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solely by burdening "'the residents of other state members of our federation."" 235
 The
Court in Metropolitan Life thus held that Alabama's purposes in enacting the domestic
preference tax were not legitimate.236
The Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp, identified the purpose of Connecticut's
regional banking law as combining "the beneficial effect of increasing the number of
banking competitors with the need to preserve a close relationship between those in the
community who need credit and those who provide credit." 2" Preserving this close
relationship is essentially retaining local control over local banking institutions and local
capital. The legislative history of Connecticut's statute supports this interpretation of the
purpose of regional banking laws. 238
 A Connecticut legislative committee reported:
The promotion of local ownership and control of banks has as one of its
objectives the preservation of a close relationship between those in our com-
munities who need credit and those who provide credit. To allow the control
of credit that is essential for the health of our state economy to pass to hands
that are not immediately responsive to the interests of Connecticut citizens
and businesses would not ... serve our state well. 2"
Legislative history of both the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes indicates that
the statutes were designed to insulate the banks in New England from competition from
the "big money center banks." 24° Massachusetts Senator John A. Brennan stated, "I just
didn't think it would be good for [Massachusetts] if the big money center banks came in
here. Our banks need the space to grow first.""' The Connecticut Legislature also
intended that the statute discriminate against non-New England out-of-state banks and
foster the growth of Connecticut and other New England banks. The Connecticut
Legislature's Hebb Commission Report 242
 proposed the regional banking law, noting
that, "to expose our smaller banks to the rigors of unlimited competition from large out-
of-state banking organizations ... would not be wise." 2a 3
Although the Northeast Bancorp Court upheld regional banking laws under the equal
protection clause, this decision conflicts with the Court's prior holdings that promoting
local business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state
purpose. 214
 Regional banking laws use discriminatory means to promote local banking.
295
	 at 1682 (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (Brennan, J.
& Harlan, J., concurring)).
236 Id. at 1684.
2" Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555.
218
 A valuable source of legislative history of the Connecticut regional banking statute is the
REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY LEGISLATION TO LIMIT THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS IN
CONNECTICUT BY SUBSIDIARIES OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE IMPACT OF NON-DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTIONS ON TRADITIONAL BANKING ACTIVITIES (1983) (hereinafter HEBB COMMISSION REPORT].
2" Id. at 10.
240 See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
241
 Enlivening Banking For Fun — Fireworks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983, at F4, cited in Note, supra
note 231, at 554.
212 HEBB COMMISSION REPORT, 51419T61 note 238.
m id, at 10-11.
2"
 Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684 (''We hold that under the circumstances of this case,
promotion of domestic business by discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate
state purpose.") Moreover, even if promoting domestic banking and ensuring local community-
based control over banking were held to be legitimate state purposes, it is doubtful that regional
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In Metropolitan Life, the Court held that while, "'a State may enact laws pursuant to its
police powers that have the purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry,' ... a
State may not constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the business of other
States, merely to protect and promote local business." 245 Thus, the Metropolitan Life Court
held that Alabama's statute did not promote a legitimate state purpose because it sought
to benefit domestic industry by erecting barriers to foreign companies wishing to do
interstate business within its borders. 246
 Yet the Massachusetts and Connecticut regional
banking laws had analogous purposes — to foster New England banks by erecting
barriers to non-New England banks desiring to acquire banks in Massachusetts and
Connecticut. Regional banking laws protect local banks by discriminating against out-of-
region banks based solely on their geographic location. This regional favoritism is in-
consistent with the general principle that state laws promoting local interests must
"regulat[e] evenhandedly. "247 The equal protection clause should protect out-of-state
banks from discriminatory state legislation.
The Court in Northeast Bancorp pointed out that regional banking laws do not favor
only the adopting state's banks at the expense of all out-of-state banks.248 Instead, the
laws favor a region over the rest of the country. 249 Justice O'Connor, however, questioned
whether this difference was significant:
It is not clear to me why completely barring the banks of 44 states is less
discriminatory than Alabama's scheme of taxing the insurance companies
from 49 states at a slightly higher rate. Nor is it clear why the Equal Protection
Clause should tolerate a regional "home team" when it condemns a state
"home team."25°
The Federal Reserve Board also observed that there was no precedent for a state law
that discriminated on a regional basis."
In distinguishing Metropolitan Life, the Northeast Bancorp Court also emphasized that
banking is of profound local concern. 252
 This reasoning is not persuasive, however,
because both Congress and the Supreme Court consider insurance, like banking, to be
banking laws contribute to such goals. Evidence indicates that regional banking laws will not result
in greater local control of banking but will actually reduce the number of truly local banks. See
Note, supra note 11, at 289-90.
2" Metropoktart Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1681 n.6 (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct.
3049, 3056 (1984)).
"" Id. at 1684.
247
	 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
248 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555.
248 Id.
2 '° Id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor found regional banking laws con-
stitutional. Id. Justice O'Connor dissented in Metropolitan Life, emphasizing states' rights to preserve
and promote local institutions and businesses. See 104 S. Ct. at 1684-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2" Appendix, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 379. The Federal Reserve Board noted:
There are many decided cases defining the permissible scope of state regulations
favoring their own residents against those of all other states, but apparently no judicial
decisions testing the constitutionality of state regulatory arrangements which discrim-
inate in favor of residents of selected regional groupings of states and exclude residents
of' all other states from the benefits provided to the regional groups.
Id,
252 Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2555.
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"of profound local concern."2" With respect to insurance, federal law specifically au-
thorizes the "continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of
insurance" and furthermore, states that the "silence on the part of Congress shall not
be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several states." 251 Even with this type of federal law authorizing state taxation of insurance
companies, the Court in Metropolitan Life held invalid under the equal protection clause
a state tax that Alabama did not impose evenhandedly. 255
The Court should have interpreted the Connecticut and Massachusetts regional
banking laws similarly. While the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA authorizes the
states to lift the ban on interstate banking, the states should not have the power to lift
the ban in a discriminatory fashion. 256 Congress may authorize the states to enact inter-
state banking laws but may not authorize the states to enact statutes which violate the
equal protection clause. 257 A state may not give its "home team" an advantage by bur-
dening foreign corporations seeking to do business within the state. 258 The equal pro-
tection clause prohibits a state from discriminating in favor of its own residents by
burdening the residents of other states 259 and should prohibit states from enacting
regional banking laws.
C. Outlook
Not only are state-enacted regional banking laws unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause, but the concept of a regional banking system is one that Congress
would be better able to plan and implement. Because these state statutes violate the
equal protection clause, Congress does not have the power simply to authorize and
thereby validate such statutes. 29° Although the equal protection clause applies to federal
legislation,28 ' Congress would not be prohibited from establishing a regional banking
253
	 at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415
(1946) (insurance is a uniquely local concern).
254 See Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011 (1945)). See supra note 122 for discussion of the McCarran -Ferguson
Act.
255
	 Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1684.
256 See Note, supra note 231, at 2034-37. See also Note, Taxing Out-of-State Corporations After
Western & Southern: An Equal Protection Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1982). A state could probably
avoid equal protection clause restraints by enacting a statute restricting bank holding company
acquisitions based on the company's total banking assets or total deposits rather than on the location
of the holding company's home state. See Note, Regional Banking Laws, supra note 15, at 556.
Nevertheless, a uniform federal interstate banking policy would be preferable to regulation by the
individual states. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1683 (although McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes
states to regulate insurance companies, the state statutes are still subject to equal protection scrutiny).
See also infra note 260 and accompanying text.
258 Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 1682.
2" Id. (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 533 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).	 •
260 See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982) (dictum) ("[N]either
Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."). See also Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional Laws: A Forgotten
Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 389 (1983).
26 ' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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system. 262 Because all the states are represented when Congress acts, the threat of state
parochialism is greatly diminished. 263 If Congress divided the country into regions, there
would be less danger of discrimination.
Moreover, a federally implemented regional banking system would be more uniform
and equitable. State implementation is putting money-center banks at a competitive
disadvantage. 25  States with large banking institutions, such as California, New York,
Illinois, and Texas are being excluded from all regions. 265
 Many bankers believe that a
haphazard pattern of interstate banking zones is undermining the policies of the
BHCA.266 Developments in the New England region show that the state-by-state imple-
mentation of a regional banking system is resulting in inconsistencies. While Massachu-
setts and Connecticut exclude non-New England bank holding companies from their
states, Maine permits full-scale interstate banking. 267 Rhode Island has a regionally
restrictive interstate banking law similar to Massachusetts's and Connecticut's, but the
regional limitation will expire in 1987. 268
The southeastern region currently forming has similar problems. Florida, Georgia,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia all have regional reciprocal banking laws,
but their definitions of the southeastern region vary. 2o6
 Georgia's definition of its region
contains four fewer states than the definitions adopted by North and South Carolina
and Virginia.' 27° Furthermore, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia
include Kentucky in their definition of the southeastern region, but Kentucky has enacted
a more restrictive statute admitting into Kentucky only those out-of-state bank holding
companies from states contiguous to Kentucky. 27 ' Congressional action is required if the
nation is to have a workable and equitable regional banking system.
262 See Note, .supra note 231, at 2038 n.81.
263 Id. In South-Central Timber, the Court noted that "when Congress acts, all segments of the
country are represented and there is significantly less danger that one State will be in a position to
exploit others." 104 S. Ct. at 2243. This case concerned state parochialism under the commerce
clause, but the Court's comment concerning Congress's power is equally relevant to questions of
parochialism under the equal protection clause.
264 Empirical Research Project, Regional Banking — A Viable Alternative? An Empirical Study, 91
CORP. L. 815, 850 (1984).
2"5 See supra notes 78 & 83 and accompanying text. The Utah statute excludes California from
its western region. UTAH Cone ANN. § 7-1-102 (1984). But see Kristof, supra note 74, at DI, col. 6.
266 The November 1985 American Bar Association journal quoted the Association of Bank
Holding Companies as follows:
"The existing laws vary markedly," the association said. "Some promote regional
reciprocal bank holding company acquisitions, and several of these provide a trigger
to nationwide banking. Some allow national reciprocity, others allow any bank holding
company anywhere to buy an institution in the state; some permit acquisition of
limited-purpose banks, while others prohibit such acquisition." Given the diversity of
these laws, the association believes the federal government has no choice but to prevent
what Volcker refers to as "bankization."
Dunnan, The Wild World of Interstate Banking, 71 A.B.A. J. 54, 56 (1985).
The journal article then quoted Don Rogers of the American Bank Holding Companies as
stating: "Iwie desperately need national guidelines ... If we leave it all up to the states, no banker
will be able to plan. — Id. at 57.
267 See supra notes 7, 9, & 72.
269 See supra note 80.
269 See supra note 81.
• 270 See id.
271 See id.
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Regional banking laws employ protectionist policies in regulating interstate banking.
Federal law embodied in the Douglas Amendment permits states to regulate interstate
bank acquisitions. Legislative history indicates that Congress envisioned selective lifting
of the federal prohibition on interstate bank acquisitions by bank holding companies.
Congress was aware of the support in banking circles for regional or trade-area arrange-
ments and still approved the language of the Douglas Amendment, which granted states
the discretion to enact statutes permitting out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire
their in-state banks. The regional banking statutes, however, violate the equal protection
clause. The Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes distinguish between out-of-state New
England banks and out-of-state non-New England banks for the sole purpose of fostering
the growth of in-state and New England banks. This violates the equal protection clause,
which prohibits a state from giving its "home team" an advantage by imposing discrim-
inatory regulations on foreign corporations.
The Supreme Court's decision to uphold regional banking laws is likely to have a
divisive effect unless Congress takes some action. Under Northeast Bancorp, each individ-
ual state legislature has the power to decide which states' bank holding companies it will
admit into its borders. Regions, consequently, are developing haphazardly. Discrimina-
tion will exclude large money-center banks from all regions. Congress should determine
what kind of regional or interstate banking system is best for the nation and should
oversee its implementation.
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